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CONTROLLING INTERESTS-DISCOUNT  
FOR LACK OF MARKETABILITY: PART 2
By Ronald D. D iM attia , CPA, ABV, CMA
My prior article (CPA Expert, Sum­
mer 2008) analyzed the concept of 
a discount for lack of marketability1 
for controlling ownership interests 
in privately held companies. The 
article analyzed the conceptual basis 
for such a discount and identified 
a possible source of empirical data, 
known as m erger arbitrage trans­
actions. As noted in the prior arti­
cle, m erger arbitrage transactions 
appear to have useful characteristics 
in assessing the discount for lack of 
marketability for controlling owner­
ship interests.
In this article, I start with a brief 
overview of valuation theory as it 
relates to discounts for lack of mar­
ketability for contro lling  owner­
ship interests. Then I analyze two 
key argum ents against a discount 
for lack of marketability for con­
trolling ownership interests: Con­
trol owners can ( l ) “put the stock 
in play” (begin the sale process) at 
their discretion and sell their own­
ership position and (2) can dictate 
the amount and timing of distribu­
tions to shareholders, and have the 
full benefit of cash flows until they 
sell their ownership position.2 Analy­
sis of both argum ents finds them 
to be lacking in certain respects.
1 It is becoming more common for valuation analysts to distinguish between marketability and liquidity when 
analyzing the valuation result for a privately held company. This article, however, will continue with the more 
generalized use of the term lack of marketability, which would include the effect of illiquidity.
2 A third argument against a discount for lack of marketability for controlling interests could be the control 
owner’s ability to cause the company to file for an initial public offering (IPO). Because an IPO is a remote 
possibility, at best, for most privately held companies, the argument is not analyzed in this article. For more 
information about the IPO argument, see “The Failed IPO Study: Insight Into the DLOM” by Gregg S. Gaffen, 
CFA, ASA, of Willamette Management Associates in the February/March 2005 issue of Focus, a newsletter of the 
AICPA Forensic & Valuation Services Section (Vol. 1, No. 2).
As a result, it appears that a con­
trolling ownership interest in a pri­
vately held company is most prop­
erly viewed as nonmarketable, and 
a discount for lack of marketabil­
ity should be considered in valuing 
such an interest.
CONTROLLING OWNERSHIP INTERESTS 
AND VALUATION THEORY
As described in my prior article, 
some controversy surrounds the 
idea that a controlling ownership 
interest is most properly viewed as 
nonm arketable (or illiquid). The 
most authoritative argument against 
the view that controlling interests 
are nonmarketable is found in the 
following statements:
...The conceptual math for each enter­
prise level indicates that value is a 
function of expected cash flow, risk, 
and expected growth. I f  an appraiser 
adequately measures expected cash 
flow and the risks and growth of those 
cash flows, the result is an enterprise 
value.
The argument against the existence of 
a marketability discount applicable to 
controlling interests is simple. I f  the 
enterprise value is determined based
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on expected cash flows, expected 
growth of those cash flows, and the 
riskiness of those cash flows, then 
what additional factors would sup­
port a discount from this value? The 
Integrated Theory suggests there are 
none.3
The stock market (in its collec­
tive wisdom) does the same thing 
in establishing prices for particu­
lar stocks. And for that m om ent 
when the stock price is evident, the 
risk /re tu rn  characteristics of the 
stock are properly captured in its 
price (barring any unusual specu­
lative influence). That is because 
valuation is a point estimate—an 
estimate at a given time. Addition­
ally, valuation reflects foreseeable 
expectations of fu ture  events— 
both within and outside the sub­
ject company. Changes in price are 
inevitable over a period of time, 
because even foreseeable events do 
not occur exactly as expected.4 As 
time goes on, the stock market con­
tinually re-evaluates the company, 
its expected cash flows, risk and 
expected growth of cash flows, and 
how these relate to the stock price. 
Minute-by-minute fluctuations in 
the stock market reflect these facts.
Therefore, any estimate of value 
on any given day is subject to risk 
because expectations of fu tu re  
events underlying the valuation 
estimate may not be realized. The
difficulty arises when a price is 
accepted and then a lengthy period 
of time must elapse before that 
price can be realized in cash. When 
the time frame to actually realize 
the quoted value covers a lengthy 
period, it is reasonable to assume 
that the potential for significant 
fluctuations in stock price is mean­
ingful.
The g rea ter difficulty is that 
unforeseen events can occur which 
would cause the market to take a 
completely d ifferent view of the 
company, its expected cash flows, 
risk and expected growth of cash 
flows, and how these relate to the 
stock price. Lack of precision in 
in te rp re tin g  foreseeable events 
com bined with the potential for 
unforeseen events cause investors 
great concern because significant 
changes in a stock’s valuation can 
result.
As a result, in order for a con­
trolling ownership interest to be 
viewed as marketable, some impor­
tant conditions must be met. First, 
there must be some certainty in 
actually receiving the quoted value 
in a timely fashion. Second, in an 
environm ent in which receipt of 
the quoted value is not timely and 
a stock price (or quoted value) 
has ample time and potential to 
vary widely, shareholder distribu­
tions must be sufficient to do three 
things prior to consummating the
actual sale:
1. During the period prior to the 
sale being consummated, distri­
butions must provide an implicit 
m arket-based re tu rn  on the 
quoted value.
2. If the stock declines prior to 
the sale being consum m ated, 
distributions must provide an 
implicit market-based return on 
the quoted value long enough 
for the stock to rebound and 
then be liquidated at the quoted 
value.
3. If the stock does not rebound 
prior to the sale being consum­
mated, distributions must com­
pensate shareholders for the 
difference between the actual 
closing price and the quoted 
value.
These conditions relate to the 
two key arguments cited earlier that 
are often advanced to support the 
position that controlling ownership 
interests are marketable. The argu­
ments are analyzed in the following 
paragraphs.
SALE OF STOCK
It is widely assumed that a control­
ling owner can put the stock in 
play, presumably at their discretion, 
and liquidate their ownership posi­
tion. But the ability to put a stock 
in play does not immediately result 
in cash and is not always successful.
3 Z. Christopher Mercer and Travis W. Harms, Business Valuation: An Integrated Theory, Second Edition (New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons), pp. 94-95.
4 A common element in the Statement of Assumptions and Limiting Conditions in many valuation reports is the following: “We do not provide assurance on the achiev­
ability of the results forecasted by [ABC Company] because events and circumstances frequently do not occur as expected; differences between actual and expected 
results may be material; and achievement of the forecasted results is dependent on actions, plans, and assumptions of management.” Statement on Standards for Valua­
tion Services No. 1, issued by the AICPA Consulting Services Executive Committee, June 2007, page 37, number 4.
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As demonstrated in my prior arti­
cle, the time to complete a transac­
tion can be lengthy and the risk of 
failure is meaningful even for the 
most marketable entities in Amer­
ica—publicly traded companies.5
Empirical data show that from 
the announcem ent of a transac­
tion to acquire a publicly traded 
company until its closing, the time 
period averages three months or 
m ore.6 A necdotal evidence indi­
cates that the sale of a privately 
held  com pany requ ires 9 to l2  
m onths.7 These periods of time 
are not inconsequential because 
during the period any num ber of 
events could occur; one being the 
failure of the transaction.
Empirical data also show that the 
failure rate of announced acqui­
sitions of publicly traded compa­
nies is roughly 20%, and anecdotal 
evidence indicates that the failure 
rate is as high as 80% in the sale of 
privately held companies.8 In times 
of economic upheaval (as we find 
ourselves in currently), a lengthy 
period  betw een announcem en t 
and closing of a transaction height­
ens the potential for deal failures. 
For example, several high-profile 
transactions ended in litigation 
because the buyer could not justify 
a price, which subsequent events 
demonstrated was too high.9
Even a cursory review of stock 
charts shows that any given stock’s 
price can vary widely over a very 
short time period—even over just 
a few days’ time. As the length of 
time grows, the opportunity  for 
variation becom es greater. Cer­
tainly, stocks can and do go up in 
price and investors reap the ben­
efit. But because investors are 
risk averse, they are principally 
concerned with the risk that the 
stock price (or quoted value) will
decline. Unfortunately, the current 
m arket environm ent amply dem ­
onstrates that stocks can experi­
ence severe declines. Many publicly 
traded  com panies have experi­
enced share price declines of 50% 
or m ore during  a two to three 
month period.
So even though a control owner 
can begin a sale process, it is not 
likely that they will receive the pro­
ceeds in a timely fashion. Further­
more, it is not a certainty that they 
will realize the quoted value of the 
stock—the price could be lower, 
or the deal could fail outright. As a 
result, an owner’s ability to begin a 
sale process is not sufficient alone 
to characterize a controlling owner­
ship interest as marketable.
SHAREHOLDER DISTRIBUTIONS
A contro lling  ow ner’s ability to 
dictate distributions is the corner­
stone of the argum ent that con­
trolling ownership interests should 
be considered  m arketable. But 
events of the last 18 months clearly 
indicate that the ability to control 
distributions is not free from risk. 
A lthough extrem e, these events 
are instructive of the types of con­
cerns investors have. A num ber 
of large and well-known com pa­
nies stopped paying dividends, or 
reduced them  dram atically.10 As 
recent events have shown, even if a 
controlling owner desired to make 
distributions he or she could be 
precluded from the decision for 
a variety of reasons including the 
following:
• Financial markets could shift, 
causing the firm to retain sub­
stantially all of its free cash flow 
to correct its financial position 
(as happened  recently in the 
banking sector).
• It is im portant to note that
the idea of a “credit crunch” 
is not unique. The U.S econ­
omy went through a m ilder 
c red it crunch  in the early 
1990s.
• Unexpected operational issues 
could develop, requ iring  the 
company to conserve cash for an 
extended period (such as a labor 
strike, several of which occurred 
in 2006/2007).
It is not a certainty that a con­
trolling owner will always have a 
certain amount of cash to distrib­
ute. Often there are periods when 
the need to m aintain operations 
will take precedence over the con­
trolling owner’s desire to distribute 
cash. These periods can be quite 
long. Smaller privately held compa­
nies seem to be much more suscep­
tible to variations in distributable 
cash flow because of inferior access 
to capital markets and less diverse 
operations. From a valuation per­
spective this is critical, because 
without the certainty of receiving 
cash on a regular basis investors are 
subjected to additional risk from 
which they seek protection.
The close link between value 
and cash flow is also problematic 
for supporting the idea that con­
tro lling ownership interests are 
m arketable. W hen a com pany’s 
stock price falls from the quoted 
value prior to being sold, the rea­
son is often that expectations of 
future cash flows have been com­
prom ised in some respect. Cer­
tainly macroeconomic or deal-spe­
cific issues could have an effect, 
but even these would often have 
some impact on expectations of the 
company’s future cash flows. In an 
environment of a lower share price 
and potentially compromised cash 
flows, is it reasonable to assume
5 Ronald D. DiMattia, “Controlling Interests — Discount for Lack of Marketability: The Empirical Evidence,” CPA Expert, Summer 2008, pp. 1-6.
6 DiMattia, p. 4.
7 DiMattia, p. 3.
8 DiMattia, pp. 3-5.
9 Examples include the Dow Chemical/Rohm & Haas transaction (which litigation settled as this article was being written) and the Huntsman/Hexion transaction.
10 Examples include Alcoa, Capital One, CBS Corp., Cedar Fair, Wells Fargo, US Bancorp, PNC, J.P. Morgan Chase and General Electric, among others.
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that the control owner can create a 
market-based return on the quoted 
value until the stock rebounds? Is it 
reasonable to assume that the con­
trol owner could distribute enough 
cash to make up for the difference 
in valuation if the stock does not 
rebound? Perhaps, on both counts, 
but it would depend on how far the 
stock has fallen, how deeply the 
cash flows have been compromised, 
how likely the price is to rebound, 
and the time frame of the hoped- 
for rebound. Given a large enough 
correction in the stock price or dis­
tributable cash flows, one is hard 
pressed to imagine a scenario that 
could work.
Practical concerns also present 
problem s for the argum ent that 
a control owner can dictate the 
amount and timing of distributions 
prior to a sale being consummated. 
Generally, controlling ownership 
interests are sold pursuant to the 
terms of a letter of intent; the terms 
are formalized and finalized in a 
purchase agreement. Most terms of 
a letter of intent are nonbinding, 
but the letter does set forth each 
party’s expectations about basic ele­
ments of the final purchase agree­
ment, the conduct of the parties 
prior to closing, and the ability of 
either party to terminate negotia­
tions. Many of these agreements set 
forth an expectation that the owner 
will not distribute cash outside the 
normal course of business prior to 
the transaction closing. Addition­
ally, purchase agreem ents often 
contain a form al representation 
that the seller has not made any 
distributions outside the normal 
course of business in the period 
prior to the transaction closing.
Interim cash flows that a control 
owner can direct to shareholders 
would certainly be a risk or con­
tingency that a valuation analyst 
must consider in assessing a dis­
count for lack of m arketability. 
But the opportunity for it is not 
so complete and determinative as
to negate the consideration of a 
discount for lack of marketability. 
Practical matters, risks and contin­
gencies associated with future cash 
flows as a support for marketability 
are too great to ignore.
CONCLUSION
This article  dem onstrates that, 
from both a theoretical and practi­
cal standpoint, controlling owner­
ship interests in privately held com­
panies are most properly viewed as 
nonmarketable. Given that selling 
a controlling ownership interest 
is not an immediate event, risk in 
actually realizing the quoted valua­
tion is substantial. Investors are not 
capable of perfect foresight, and as 
time progresses one would expect 
investors to re-evaluate the basis 
of their valuation. More troubling 
is the em ergence of unforeseen 
events, which can have a signifi­
cant impact on an investors’ valua­
tion. Therefore, the argument that 
controlling interests are marketable 
relies on the owner’s ability to 1) 
put the stock in play and 2) direct 
distributions to shareholders.
However, an owner’s ability to 
put the stock in play is not suffi­
cient to characterize a controlling 
ownership interest as marketable. 
Empirical evidence indicates that 
the time to realize the quoted value 
in cash is lengthy and the risk of 
deal failure is meaningful. Stock 
market data also indicate that the 
potential for a significant fall-off in 
valuation during the period prior 
to a transaction being consum ­
mated is meaningful.
Similarly, an owners’ ability to 
direct distributions to shareholders 
is not sufficient to characterize a 
controlling ownership interest as 
marketable. It is not a certainty that a 
controlling owner will have sufficient 
cash available to make distributions 
to shareholders. Additionally, from 
a practical perspective a control 
owner’s ability to make distributions 
often is severely restricted during the
period prior to a transaction being 
consummated.
Because investors are risk averse, 
they are concerned with the poten­
tial for a price decline from the 
point of the quoted value to the 
point it is realized as cash. O ur 
attempt, then, is to measure how 
much protection an investor will 
require to accept a point estimate 
of value, knowing that it will not be 
realized until a meaningful period 
of time has elapsed. O ffsetting 
this risk would be the interim cash 
flows that can be distributed. Even 
so, meaningful risks exist for the 
controlling owner, and it is logical 
to expect that a rational investor 
would seek protection from such 
risks. The expected form of such 
protection would be a discount to 
reflect the relative lack of market­
ability.
To be sure, m arketability is a 
concept that is heavily influenced 
by the valuation analyst’s judgment. 
A guidepost, then, would be useful 
to help form the analyst’s ju d g ­
ment. The previous article in CPA 
Expert, Summer 2008, indicated 
that studies of m erger arbitrage 
could be a good indicator of the 
lack of marketability of a control­
ling ownership interest. The spread 
in these transactions reflects arbi­
trageurs’ estimates of the risk that 
expectations of future events will 
not occur as planned in the period 
prior to closing. Although more 
research is needed, it would appear 
that studies of m erger arbitrage 
could be a useful guidepost. X
Ronald D. D iM attia, CPA, ABV, CMA, is 
president of Corporate Value Partners, 
Inc. in Rocky River, Ohio, (440) 333-1910. 
His firm specializes in providing corporate 
finance consulting services to small and 
midsized businesses.
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Expert OPINION
IN REMARRIAGE OF THORNHILL: EMERGING ISSUES IN 
STANDARD OF VALUE DETERMINATIONS FOR FAMILY LAW 
MATTERS
By Brenda M. C la rke , C P A / A B V / C F F , CVA, and Ronald L. Se ign e u r, MBA, C P A /A B V /C F F , CVA
Many business analysts focus a sub­
stantial portion of their practice 
on family law matters, including 
the valuation of ownership inter­
ests in closely held businesses and 
professional practices. As in most 
valuation engagements, the initial 
threshold questions to be resolved 
before proceeding to develop a 
work plan, inclusive of a request for 
the required information, include 
the determination of the appropri­
ate standard of value, the premise 
of value, and the date of value to 
use for the underlying analysis and 
opinion.
Most analysts are accustomed to 
having their client or client’s legal 
counsel provide these three funda­
mental elements. As we know, with­
out employing the proper standard 
of value, one cannot expect to get 
the right answer to the valuation con­
clusion being sought. To complicate 
this matter, the proper standard of 
value for family law matters varies in 
different jurisdictions. Some states 
define the proper standard of value 
by statute, such as Arkansas1 and Lou­
isiana,1 2 whereas other states rely on 
prior litigated precedents, such as 
Newjersey3 and California.4 5
Recently, a family law valuation 
matter in Colorado received signifi­
cant attention because of its rela­
tionship to the standard of value
question. In the case In re Marriage 
of [Chuck and Antoinette] Thornhill,5 
the trial court allowed for a 33% dis­
count for lack of marketability, using 
a Fair Market Value standard, on a 
70.5% controlling interest in an oil 
and gas business located on the west­
ern slope of Colorado. The applica­
tion of a Fair Market Value (FMV) 
standard was appealed to the Colo­
rado Court of Appeals, which ruled 
that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in rendering its decision. 
The appellate decision has recently 
been granted a Writ of Certiorari 
before the Colorado Supreme Court 
(the Court) on two distinct and sepa­
rate issues.
The first issue to be considered 
by the Court relates to the basis of 
the trial court’s award of a temporary 
maintenance award and is beyond 
the scope of this article. The sec­
ond issue is whether the trial court 
erred in not considering the find­
ings in Pueblo Bancorporation v. Lindoe, 
7wc.6 (Pueblo/Lindoe),7 which effec­
tively established the guidelines for 
application of the Fair Value stan­
dard in Colorado cases involving dis­
senting and oppressed shareholders. 
The Court ruled in the Pueblo/Lin- 
doe matter that Fair Value in Col­
orado is equivalent to Fair Market 
Value without the application of a 
discount for lack of marketability. It
is widely accepted in Colorado that 
this is now the appropriate standard 
for these types of litigated proceed­
ings, but, heretofore, there has not 
been any consensus about whether 
the Fair Value standard, as defined in 
Pueblo/Lindoe, is appropriate in the 
determinations of value for equitable 
distribution in family law matters.
In its ruling, the appellate court 
stated the following:
We conclude the considerations 
that underlie the Pueblo Bancorpo­
ration decision are inapplicable 
in a dissolution proceeding for 
several reasons. The dissolution 
statutes do not contain the ‘fair 
value’ language of section 7-113- 
101(4) that was critical to the 
court’s analysis. Its comprehen­
sive review of similar statutes in 
other jurisdictions led to its con­
clusion that ‘fair value’ does not 
mean ‘fair market value,’ and, as 
a result, the common practice of 
including a marketability discount 
in calculating fair market value is 
not permitted in dissenting share­
holder valuations.
The court went on to say the fol­
lowing:
We are instead persuaded by the 
decisions of num erous o ther 
jurisdictions that have concluded
1 Arkansas Code §9-12-315.(4).
2 Louisiana Code §9-2801-(l) (a); 9:2801.2.
3 Brown v. Brown 348 N.J. Superior Ct. 466; 792 A.2d 463.
4 Golden v. Golden, 270 Cal. App. 2d 401, 75 Cal. Rptr. 735 Cal.App.Dist.2; March 5, 1969.
5 In re Marriage of Thornhill, 2008 WL 3877223 (Colo. App.) (Aug. 21, 2008).
6 Ibid.
7 Pueblo Bancorporation v. Lindoe, Inc., P.3d 353 (Colo. 2003).
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marketability discounts may be 
applied in valuing shares in closely 
held corporations in dissolution 
proceedings. Such a discount 
would be applied to reflect the 
fact that shares of stock in such 
corporations are less marketable 
than publicly traded stock, a fac­
tor that an ordinary buyer would 
take into consideration in decid­
ing what to pay for the shares.
The cross petition for Writ of Cer­
tiorari was granted in mid-February 
2009 to hear the issue of whether 
the appellate court erred by refusing 
to extend the holding of Pueblo/ 
Lindoe to divorce proceedings, 
thereby allowing the application of 
a marketability discount in valuing 
a closely held corporation operated 
as a going concern at the time of the 
parties’ dissolution of marriage pro­
ceeding.
The trial court relied on testi­
mony submitted by separate experts 
retained by both the petitioner and 
respondent. Apparently the court 
found more compelling the evidence 
and testimony of the petitioner’s 
expert, who had utilized a Fair Mar­
ket Value standard and applied the 
33% lack of marketability discount 
to Mr. Thornhill’s 70.5% ownership 
interest in his oil and gas business.8 9
A couple of factors identified by the 
appellate court are also worth not­
ing. The wife was not represented 
by legal counsel when the parties 
entered into a separation agreement 
providing for maintenance and divid­
ing the marital estate. At the time 
of the scheduled trial court hear­
ing to enter into a final decree, the 
wife realized that she did not have 
a good understanding of the value 
of the marital assets and, therefore, 
disavowed the original separation
agreement as being unfair to her. 
It is interesting to note that she was 
assisted in negotiating the separa­
tion agreement by her father, who 
happened to be the CFO of the 
husband’s business at the time. The 
appellate court noted that purely 
by virtue of his role as CFO of the 
husband’s business, the father was 
required to attempt the preservation 
of the business assets, which resulted 
in dual loyalties.
The appellate court concluded 
that the considerations that underlie 
the Pueblo/Lindoe decision are not 
applicable in a dissolution proceeding 
for “several reasons,” including that 
the state statutes do not contain the 
“fair value” language that was critical 
in the Pueblo/Lindoe decision. The 
same court also declined to adopt the 
holding of the New Jersey landmark 
case Brown v. Brown9 in which the 
New Jersey appellate court extended 
the reasoning of cases under New 
Jersey dissenting shareholder statutes 
to hold that marketability discounts 
are not appropriate in dissolution 
proceedings. Instead, the appellate 
court stated that trial courts in 
dissolution cases act as courts of 
equity and should have discretion 
w hether to apply m arketability 
d isco u n ts  in  va lu in g  closely 
held corporations in dissolution 
proceedings, while stating that the 
court expressed no opinion about the 
amount or percentage of the discount 
that may be applied. It continued by 
stating that trial courts should make 
a clear record about the reason for 
applying a given discount rate to 
facilitate review on appeal.
The finding and application of 
valuation theory and concepts in 
this matter raises the following key 
issues that are worthy of note by val­
uation analysts:
1. What is the proper standard of 
value in family law matters in Col­
orado?
2. How is a 33% lack of m arket­
ability discount justified on what 
appears to be a 70.5% controlling 
interest?
3. W hen the facts indicate that 
there is an identified “buyer” in 
the instance of family law matters, 
based on prior appellate prece­
dents in the subject jurisdiction, 
can the Fair Market Value or Fair 
Value standards be used, given 
the commonly accepted defini­
tions of each of these standards?
4. If the subject ownership inter­
est was not controlling, would 
the trial court have allowed a 
discount for lack of control or 
minority interest?
Many states, such as Arizona,10 1
California11 and Kentucky12, have 
recognized precedents that reflect 
the concept commonly referred to 
as value to the holder under an invest­
ment value premise, which is some­
times referred to as the value the 
propertied spouse would be will­
ing to pay into the marital estate to 
retain the benefits of their owner­
ship interest in a business or profes­
sional practice. This concept relies 
on the notion of an identified seller 
(the propertied spouse) and, there­
fore, runs contrary to the require­
ment for a hypothetical willing buyer 
under Fair Market Value.13
In other words, the assumed seller 
used in the Value to the Holder 
premise is the owner of the interest, 
and this moves the focus to Invest­
ment Value in terms of what this spe­
cific buyer is willing to pay into the 
marital estate to retain the rights and 
benefits of the interest. With this in 
mind, we can envision a spectrum of
8 It is important to note that all family law cases are sealed at the Colorado Court of Appeals and therefore it is not possible to review any of the pleadings or findings.
9 792 A.2d 463 (N.J. SupCT. App. Div. 2002).
10 Mitchell v. Mitchell 152 Ariz. 317 732 P. 2d 208 (1987).
11 See footnote no. 4.
12 Clark v. Clark, 782 S.W. 2d 56 1990 Ky. App. Lexis 3 (Ky. CT. App. 1990).
13 Defined in the current edition of the International Glossary of Business Valuation Terms as “the price, expressed in terms of cash equivalents, at which property would 
change hands between a hypothetical willing and able buyer and a hypothetical willing and able seller, acting at arm’s length in an open and unrestricted market, when 
neither is under compulsion to buy or sell and when both have reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts.”
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the premise of value ranging from 
what the Fair Market Value would 
be between a willing buyer and will­
ing seller in an assumed exchange 
to what the Investment Value would 
be to the specific holder of the inter­
est. In most appraisal settings, dis­
counts for lack of marketability and 
lack of control are explicitly relevant 
in an assumed exchange transaction, 
whereas similar discounts would not 
necessarily be relevant or appropri­
ate for the value proposition to a spe­
cific identified holder of the owner­
ship interest when an imminent sale 
or an assumed exchange between a 
buyer and seller is not expected to 
occur.
Consistent with this range of 
value premise, we believe Colorado 
has followed an Investment Value 
and Value to the Holder approach, 
based on the findings in In re Mar­
riage of Grafff In re Marriage of Mar­
tin15 and In re the Marriage of Huff.16 
In all of these decisions, the court 
makes specific reference to the value 
being what the propertied spouse 
would pay for the ownership inter­
est in question, as opposed to what a 
hypothetical buyer would be willing 
to pay. The propertied spouse obvi­
ously brings an entirely different ori­
entation to the table because he or 
she would typically have motivations 
and reasons why he or she would pay 
a higher value into the marital estate 
to retain the rights and entitlements 
of the ownership interest in ques­
tion. In an Investment Value and 
Value to the Holder premise, there is 
typically little rationale for a discount 
for lack of marketability of any mag­
nitude.
For example, in the Huff case, the 
appellate court noted that the valu­
ation method used was appropriate 
because it provided the best indica­
tion of the value of the husband’s 
interest in his law practice part­
nership to himself, as opposed to
another willing buyer or seller. The 
appellate decision also noted that 
an individual practitioner’s inability 
to sell his or her interest in the prac­
tice does not eliminate the existence 
of goodwill and its value as an asset 
to be considered in equitable distri­
bution, and such equitable distribu­
tion does not require conveyance 
or transfer of any particular asset. 
Similarly, in the Martin case, the 
appellate court noted that the value 
of goodwill is not necessarily depen­
dent upon what a willing buyer 
would pay for such goodwill, stat­
ing that the important consideration 
is whether the business interest has 
value to the propertied spouse above 
and beyond the tangible assets. In 
the Graff case, the appellate court 
noted the value of the subject’s State 
Farm insurance agency ownership 
interest should be based on what 
the agency was worth to the owner, 
notwithstanding specific restrictions 
on the transfer of the insurance 
agency by State Farm. The Graff 
decision also specifically noted that 
the value of goodwill is not necessar­
ily dependent upon what a willing 
buyer would pay for such goodwill; 
rather, the important consideration 
is whether the business has value to 
the spouse over and above the tan­
gible assets.
Notwithstanding significant Colo­
rado family law precedent that pri­
marily supports an Investment Value 
and Value to the Holder premise, it 
is clear so far that if the trial court 
wants to apply an alternate Fair 
Market Value standard, such as that 
adopted in Thornhill, then a discount 
for lack of marketability may well 
apply. The key point here is that it 
is routinely more of an issue with 
noncontrolling interests under FMV, 
versus the 70.5% ownership Mr. 
Thornhill controlled in the subject 
business, in which it is considered 
unreasonable to take such a large
discount. Most often, controlling 
interests in closely held businesses 
are not discounted at all for lack of 
marketability under even a Fair Mar­
ket Value standard. This is due to 
the fundamental fact that the con­
trolling owner can indeed decide to 
sell at any time, and often quite effi­
ciently, notwithstanding the absence 
of a public market. Unfortunately, 
the m agnitude of the discount 
allowed in this case for a controlling 
interest is not an issue that will be 
heard by the Court.
If the Thornhill interest at issue 
had been a 20% share of the enter­
prise, many valuation analysts would 
begin to be much more comfort­
able with lack of marketability dis­
counts approaching a 25% to 35% 
range, similar to what was utilized 
in Thornhill. This smaller m inor­
ity interest might also require con­
sideration of a discount for lack of 
control or minority interest, often 
of a like amount under a Fair Mar­
ket Value standard. Both discounts 
are very fact-specific and draw upon 
numerous sources to help support 
the proper levels.
Valuation analysts typically are 
provided with the proper standard of 
value to use in their appraisal assign­
ment, along with the proper premise 
of value (for example, going concern 
versus liquidation) and date of value, 
at the onset of their engagement. 
When the trier of fact in equitable 
distribution cases can determine the 
proper standard of value based on 
the facts and circumstances of each 
case, we can expect to see wide varia­
tions in the ultimate finding of value 
for the subject closely held owner­
ship interest in businesses and pro­
fessional practices. This is because 
of the m agnitude of the impact 
(for example, up to 50% or 60%) 
on whether the aforem entioned 
discounts are deemed appropriate. 
In some instances, the analyst will
14 In re Marriage of Graff, 902 P. 2d 402 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
15 In re Marriage of Martin, 707 P. 2d 1035 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985).
16 In re the Marriage of Huff, 834 P. 2d. 244.
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need to provide conclusions under 
more than one standard of value to 
allow the trier of fact to evaluate what 
value is ultimately deemed appro­
priate in any specific case in which 
the proper standard of value remains 
undefined, as is the case presently in 
Colorado.
An important point of compari­
son with all of this is to evaluate how 
the premise and standard of value 
choices are used in other appraisal 
disciplines, such as real estate, which 
if done right, uses a similarly defined 
fair m arket value standard17 and 
draws much of its work from use of 
m arket comparables. Em bedded 
within the use of the market method 
in real estate appraisals is an inher­
ent discount for the marketability or 
lack thereof of the subject property. 
This often creates baseline confusion 
in comparison to business appraisal 
indications under a Value to the 
Holder premise in which market­
ability discounts are not applied. For 
a trier of fact, this creates an envi­
ronment in which some assets (for 
example, closely held businesses) are 
not subject to reductions in value for 
discounts for lack of a ready market, 
while other marital assets (for exam­
ple, the marital home and owned 
autos) are effectively discounted.
One thing is certain in the final 
analysis here. It is very clear that 
there are great distinctions in what 
standard of value is appropriate
between jurisdictions and that states 
with the standard of value for disso­
lu tion of m arriage proceedings 
based on court case precedent can 
be expected to have an ever-evolving 
landscape, such as is the case cur­
rently in Colorado. X
Brenda M. Clarke, CPA/ABV, CVA, is an 
associate partner and Ronald L. Seigneur, 
MBA, CPA/ABV, CVA, is partner/valuation 
specialist with Seigneur Gustafson LLP, 
Lakewood, Co. Both contribute frequently 
to AICPA publications. Mr. Seigneur has 
chaired the AICPA ABV Credential Com­
mittee and served on several other AICPA 
committees including the Consulting Ser­
vices Executive Committee and the Busi­
ness Valuation Committee.
17 It should be noted that fair market value in real estate valuation has slightly different distinctions, such as time allotted for exposure to the marketplace.
INTERVIEW SAFETY 
AWARENESS
By Randal A. W olverton, C P A /C FF, CFE
Forensic accountants and o ther 
accounting professionals have more 
interview training opportunities than 
ever before; however, interview safety 
is often neglected. Are CPAs exposed 
to violent encounters in their every­
day practice? Probably not. Such vio­
lence may be so rare that statistics on 
such situations may not even exist. 
However, the truth is that the poten­
tial is real, and the consequences 
may be dire. With a little knowledge 
and planning, interviewers can avoid 
exposure to potential violence.
As more fraud schemes are being 
uncovered in a declining economy, 
professional accountants, by virtue 
of their knowledge of the books and 
records as well as the operations of 
an organization, understandably are 
relied upon to assist with fraud inves­
tigations. Fraud-related engagements 
make the chances of encountering a 
fraud suspect or suspects more likely,
but many engagements may 
not start with the expectation 
of discovering fraud. The fact­
finding process can quickly 
turn  into a fraud matter, 
thereby changing the dynam­
ics of contacts and interviews. 
As always, advice of coun­
sel should be sought if allegations 
of fraud are discovered during an 
engagement, especially if the accoun­
tant has little or no experience in con­
ducting a fraud investigation.
A lth o u g h  v io len ce  ag a in s t
accountants may not occur often, it 
has happened on occasion. The ris­
ing frequency and severity of such 
workplace violence not only is dis­
turbing but also is getting increased 
media attention and is becoming 
the subject of more formal studies. It 
also is not surprising that workplace 
violence has resulted in a number 
of injuries and fatalities across the 
United States. Statistics confirm that, 
on many occasions, the perpetra­
tor directs the violence at whomever 
he or she feels is responsible for 
taunting, disciplining or dismissal. 
It is worth noting that many perpe­
trators resort to extreme violence
when finally overwhelmed by cir­
cumstances, but the events leading 
to their angst have occurred over 
time. How do we know when some 
people reach the breaking point? 
The answer is that we don’t, but we 
can recognize signs of discord that 
should raise our concern in certain 
interview situations.
Trained law enforcem ent offi­
cers know that, although violence 
is less frequent in financial crime 
investigations than other types of 
investigations, such encounters can 
occur. Knowing that violence is less 
frequent may make it very easy to be 
lulled into complacency when deal­
ing with white-collar crime witnesses 
and suspects. Just as there is no 
“routine” car stop, there also should 
never be a “routine” interview when 
dealing with potential fraud. Con­
sider that persons committing fraud 
will know whether the interviewer 
asking the questions is a law enforce­
ment officer armed with weapons, 
handcuffs and arrest powers. The 
same suspects also will know that an 
accountant is not. Therefore, recog­
nition and reduction of risks become 
more important.
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PREPARING FOR THE INTERVIEW
Much can be done prior to an inter­
view to identify and reduce potential 
risks. Professional accountants are 
typically skilled in documentation, 
accuracy and preparation, and they 
can use the same skills to reduce risks 
in the interview process. Consider 
the following recommendations:
1. Employee and engagement data. If 
traveling outside the office, 
inform  someone at the home 
office of the date, time and loca­
tion of the interview, the partici­
pants, and the expected time of 
return. Also leave at the office 
descriptions and license numbers 
of vehicles being driven to the 
engagement.
2. Telephone contact checks. Leave with 
someone at the home office a 
contact telephone number at the 
destination and a personal cell 
phone number. Before leaving 
the office, make a quick check to 
determine if your cell phone is 
operational and charged. If pos­
sible, you should know whether 
your cell phone has coverage at 
your destination. In the event of 
an emergency, a 911 operator will 
want to know immediately the full 
names of the persons involved; 
their approximate ages, physical 
descriptions, clothing descrip­
tions, cell phone numbers and 
vehicles and license numbers; the 
full addresses of locations involved 
and other pertinent data.
3. Partner interviews. Avoid situa­
tions in which you are asked to 
meet a person alone, particularly 
if the person is not well known 
to you. Having a second person 
as a witness during an interview 
is recommended for practical as 
well as safety reasons. A coworker 
as a witness also may reduce the 
chances of false accusations of 
misconduct.
4. Locations. If possible, conduct inter­
views in business locations dur­
ing normal business hours when 
other persons are on the premises. 
Interviews in hotel lobbies may be
appropriate but interviews in hotel 
rooms are probably not. Avoid 
interviews in bars, parking lots and 
private vehicles. Discourage the 
use of alcohol during professional 
engagements. Although interviews 
in private homes can be appro­
priate if the interviewee is known 
and trusted, view the situation 
with caution. Interviews in govern­
ment buildings will offer screening 
devices that provide assurance that 
firearms and other weapons are 
removed. Also, consider conduct­
ing interviews in your home office 
in a room with furniture arranged 
to enhance safety as well as effec­
tive communications.
Identity of persons contacted. If you 
are unfamiliar with the person 
being interviewed, ask for a busi­
ness card. View the business card 
carefully and retain it for your 
records. Always ask for full names, 
addresses, contact numbers and 
job  descriptions. Try to gather 
this information in advance when 
arranging a date and time for a 
meeting.
6. Dress and demeanor. An in te r­
viewer and partner should always 
be appropriately  dressed and 
conduct themselves in a cour­
teous and professional manner. 
Avoid disclosing personal infor­
mation about yourselves during 
the interview.
7. Trust your instincts. A lthough 
you cannot conduct a thorough 
background check on the per­
son being interviewed, you can 
change the date and location of 
an interview if you believe that 
som ething is amiss. If you’re 
uneasy, take control of the cir­
cumstances until you reach your 
desired comfort level. It is easy 
to explain changes by saying that 
company policy dictates the cir­
cumstances of interviews.
DURING THE INTERVIEW
Once at the interview location, inter­
viewers need to maintain their guard. 
The following recommendations will
help interviewers to recognize and 
deal with threatening situations:
1. Awareness. The vast majority of con­
tacts by professional accountants 
will proceed without safety prob­
lems; however, our awareness and 
skepticism should continuously 
increase as we move closer to the 
subject of fraud. Remember, many 
fraudsters have been concealing a 
scheme for long periods of time, so 
you may be viewed as an immedi­
ate threat to their plans.
2. Interview location. When you first 
enter the room to be used for 
an interview, take a mental note 
of the layout. In the event of a 
problem, do you and your partner 
have an escape route? Try to avoid 
a situation in which an angry per­
son or other physical obstacles can 
block your exit. Also, if an inter­
viewee becomes angry, does he 
or she have an escape route that 
does not involve going through 
you? You should consider having 
a table or other piece of furniture 
between you and the person being 
interviewed. Take a mental note 
of objects in the room that could 
be used as weapons against you or 
that you might use to protect your­
self, such as telephones, objects 
on desks and tables, lamps, small 
chairs and so on.
3. Physical red flags. D uring an 
interview, be aware of behav­
ioral reactions that may indicate 
stress, uneasiness, or even anger. 
Increased perspiration, dryness 
of the mouth or a cracking voice 
can be an indication of internal 
turmoil.
4. Oral red flags. If you listen carefully, 
a person under stress may provide 
clues to potential outbursts. Our 
concern and skepticism should 
intensify if the person being inter­
viewed makes comments about 
violence, excessive alcohol or drug 
use, depression, abusive relation­
ships, anger, resentment, financial 
problems or threats.
5. Admissions and confessions. A person 
confessing to misconduct may be
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viewing his or her world as falling 
apart and see the persons in the 
room  as bearing some blame 
for the situation. Depression 
and anger are common in these 
circumstances and may influence 
the th ink ing  of the  person  
confessing to improper conduct. 
Many people have expressed relief 
while calmly confessing to serious 
misconduct, but do not be fooled 
into complacency. As an example, 
a person  being  tre a te d  for 
depression may have the benefit 
of powerful drugs to control mood 
swings. What if he or she did not 
take the medication that day? Also,
MADOFF "GAMED" 
THE SYSTEM
Annette M. S ta lk e r, C P A /C FF, CFE, and M ichael G.
U e ltze n , C P A /C FF, CFE
Through a combination of leader­
ship in regulatory organizations, the 
opaque nature of his operations and 
his seemingly philanthropic endeav­
ors, Bernard Madoff was uniquely 
positioned to exploit regulatory 
gaps for personal gain.
For m ore than 30 years, the 
unparalleled Ponzi scheme Madoff 
conducted escaped detection. Many 
wonder “How could this happen?” 
and “Where were the regulators?” 
Yes, Madoff operated in a highly 
regulated environment, but there 
is a fine line between reasonable, 
effective regulation and burdensome 
rules that eliminate the small broker- 
dealers and investment advisers, as 
well as professionals providing ser­
vices to them.
Early in his career, M adoff 
became involved with the launch of 
the National Association of Securi­
ties Dealers (NASD), a self-regulatory 
agency for broker-dealer firms. The 
NASD later created the NASDAQ
consider that if you arranged the 
interview in advance, the person 
may believe that he or she will be 
confronted with incriminating 
in form ation , thereby raising 
his or her anxiety level. As the 
interviewer, you will most likely not 
know this prior to your arrival.
6. Worst-case scenario. Preparing in 
advance for potential dangers 
may be the difference between a 
positive resolution of a bad situ­
ation or something much worse. 
In an emergency, can you pro­
tect yourself? If necessary, can you 
escape an enclosed location, put 
distance between you and danger
stock exchange on which 
Madoff served as chairman of 
the board from 1990 to 1993. 
In effect, Madoff helped shape 
the rules for private broker- 
dealers, which were enforced 
by the NASD1 and the Securi­
ties and Exchange Commis­
sion (SEC). Many of Madoff's 
close relatives held positions in sev­
eral financial sector agencies, includ­
ing the Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority’s (FINRA’s) compliance 
board, the NASD, the National Adju­
dicatory Council (mutual fund task 
force) and the Securities Industry and 
Financial Markets Association (secu­
rities firm trade association). Many 
financial services regulators and lead­
ers looked to Madoff for input and 
guidance on the rules.
On a personal level, M adoff 
appeared to be a generous bene­
factor of the Jewish community. He 
gained their instant trust, based on 
his apparent contributions, upstand­
ing character and financial acumen. 
In the world of Ponzi schemes, a 
fraudster can gain access to later 
victims through this type of “affinity 
group.”
In this case, it is particularly trou­
bling that Madoff preyed on many 
charitable foundations and pension-
and relay accurate information to 
authorities?
Many of the preceding recom­
mendations may seem obvious and 
intuitive; however, an emergency sit­
uation is not the time to be plan­
ning your actions. X
Randal A. Wolverton, CPA/CFF, CFE, is a 
retired FBI Supervisory Special Agent. He 
currently participates in mortgage fraud and 
asset forfeiture investigations as a contrac­
tor for the FBI. He also serves on the AICPA 
Forensic & Litigation Services Committee. 
He can be contacted at randal.wolverton@ 
ic.fbi.gov.
ers. These organizations and indi­
viduals depended completely on the 
promises of a fraudster who lied, 
cheated and stole for decades.
Even with such a cunning and 
convincing fraudster, many wonder 
“Shouldn’t there have been checks 
and balances in place to ensure one 
person could not wreak so much 
damage?”
WHAT WAS THE REGULATORY 
ENVIRONMENT?
Broker-Dealer Oversight
The SEC regulates the activities of 
securities broker-dealers under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(Exchange Act). FINRA, a self-regu­
latory organization funded through 
broker-dealer participant fees, was 
formed in 2007 by combining the 
NASD with the New York Stock 
Exchange’s m em ber regulation, 
enforcement and arbitration func­
tions. FINRA provides education, 
conducts examinations and writes 
and enforces rules for registered 
broker-dealers but not for invest­
m ent advisers. Madoff was instru­
mental in developing the govern­
ing rules through his role on the 
boards of the NASD, the NASDAQ 
and other agencies.
1 In 2007, the National Association of Securities Dealers and the New York Stock Exchange’s member regulation, enforcement and arbitration division merged and 
became the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA).
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Investment Advisory Oversight 
The activities of investment advisers 
are governed by the Investment Advis­
ers Act of 1940 (Advisers Act), and the 
activities of investment companies are 
governed by the Investment Company 
Act of 1940. The SEC, not FINRA, is 
the sole agency authorized to enforce 
the Advisers Act.
Bernard L. Madoff Investment 
Securities LLC (BLMIS) was unique 
in that Madoff was both a regis­
tered investment adviser and a bro­
ker-dealer. The full extent of assets 
under management was never visible 
to any one regulatory body because 
of his extensive use of “funds of 
funds.” Also, because he did not 
charge fees for asset manage 
ment but only for trade exe­
cution, no revenue would 
have been reported as asset 
management fees. Madoff 
avoided registering with 
the SEC as an investment 
adviser until 2006, follow­
ing an SEC investigation related to 
his investment advisory business.2
Madoff was able to deflect SEC and
FINRA regulatory oversight because of 
his knowledge of the overlapping duties 
and responsibilities of the two organi­
zations. Madoff gamed the system.
Many of the various funds (both 
direct and ind irect investors to 
Madoff) that were invested wholly or 
partially in Madoff had an investment 
adviser. They were typically respon­
sible for determining and placing the 
funds’ monies into investment vehi­
cles and ensuring that the nature of 
investments were in line with the fund 
agreement and placement memoran­
dum criteria. These advisers were reg­
istered with the SEC.
Madoff deflected SEC oversight by using 
other organizations that were required to 
be registered with the SEC as investment
advisers to serve as the intermediary ever, only the statement of financial
for investments in the Madoff funds. 
Madoff gamed the system.
Madoff Pyramid
Madoff, "shadow" Investment Adviser
Layers and Layers of 
Hedge Funds 




U n k n o w n  N u m b e r  o f  E n d  C u s to m e r s
Charitable
Foundations Pensioners Retirees Universities
Individuals
Independent Accountant Oversight
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 cre­
ated the Public Company Account­
ing Oversight Board (PCAOB), 
which was designed to oversee the 
auditors of public companies. An 
accounting firm registered with the 
PCAOB is subject to the standards 
set by the PCAOB, as well as over­
sight and enforcement.
Audits of entities that are required 
to file financial statements under 
Section 17(e) of the Exchange Act 
must be performed by independent 
accounting firms registered with the 
PCAOB. Beginning in August 2003, 
the SEC issued a series of orders 
granting nonpublic broker-dealers 
temporary exemptions from the obli­
gation of filing financial statements 
audited by registered public account­
ing firms. Madoff filed an Annual 
Form X-17A-5. The face sheet of the 
form indicates several financial state­
ments and reports are included; how-
condition is publicly available.
Madoff was careful to select a CPA 
firm not registered with the PCAOB 
and not subject to professional peer 
review. Madoff gamed the system.
WAS MADOFF ABLE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE 
OF THE REGULATORY EXCEPTIONS?
The following regulatory exceptions 
were in place for private securities 
firms, such as BLMIS:
• Custody rule exception. An amend­
ment to the Advisers Act through 
Rule 206(4)-2 became effective 
November 5, 2003, and provided 
that certain registered investment 
advisers who use a qualified cus­
todian (for example, a registered 
broker-dealer) to maintain client 
assets were no longer required 
to submit to annual surprise 
audits by an in d ep e n d e n t 
public accountant as long as 
the custod ian  sends p e ri­
odic account statements to the 
adviser’s clients at least quarterly. 
BLMIS was both an investment 
adviser and qualified custodian 
via the registered broker-dealer 
status pursuant to Section 15(b) 
(1) of the Exchange Act. Despite 
the exception to the custody rules 
for investment advisers, the SEC 
complaint against David Friehling 
of the Friehling and Horowitz 
CPA firm indicates that internal 
control reports for BLMIS were 
filed annually. Based on other 
media reports, it appears that 
Frank DiPascali, referred to as a 
key lieutenant of the Madoff firm, 
may have sent audit reports and 
internal control reports prepared 
by Friehling and Horowitz and 
other account statements to cli­
ents, other independent accoun­
tants or both.
Accountant registration exception. 
Section 17 (a) of the Exchange
2 To put the magnitude of oversight into perspective, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) currently has oversight of more than 5,000 reporting companies; 
5,500 broker-dealers; 11,000 investment advisers and, in conjunction with FINRA, in excess of 600,000 registered representatives. In the most recent year, the SEC con­
ducted examinations of 1,500 investment advisers and, in conjunction with FINRA, in excess of 55% of the registered broker-dealers.
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Act requires registered broker- 
dealers to provide certain “certi­
fied financial information" to the 
SEC and customers; Section 17(e) 
was amended in 2002 by the Sar­
banes Oxley Act to require that 
the financial information of the 
issuer be certified by a “registered 
public accounting firm” of the 
PCAOB. This requirem ent had 
been continually deferred by the 
SEC through a series of releases 
through fiscal years ending before 
January 1, 2009.
Selecting the Friehling and Horow­
itz CPA firm was a deliberate act to 
avoid PCAOB and professional peer 
review oversight. Madoff gamed the 
system.
WERE MADOFF'S HEDGE FUND CLIENTS 
SUBJECT TO REGULATION?
Private hedge funds are not cur­
rently required to be registered with 
the SEC; however, approximately 
20% of all fund firms have regis­
tered with the agency since 2006. 
Madoff's use of the “split strike con­
version” 3 hedge provided him the 
cover of a seemingly plausible invest­
ment strategy.
Because reg is tra tio n  is n o t 
required, the SEC does not have pur­
view over the magnitude of funds 
involved and, therefore, at risk.
Once again, Madoff carefully selected 
investment vehicles that were not sub­
ject to extensive oversight by the SEC or 
others. Madoff gamed the system.
In add ition  to engaging an 
accounting firm not registered with 
the PCAOB and dealing with hedge 
funds, Madoff avoided in-depth over­
sight by the SEC and FINRA because 
of the lack of a coordinated oversight 
program of broker-dealers and invest­
ment advisers. Evidence also exists 
that Madoff lied to the regulators and 
apparently contacted some of his inves­
tors in advance of SEC investigations.
Madoff gamed the system to the 
great detriment of thousands. X
Annette Stalker, CPA/CFF, CFE, is director 
and Michael G. Ueltzen, CPA/CFF, CFE, is 
partner in the forensic accounting practice 
of Ueltzen and Company, Sacramento. Mr. 
Ueltzen chairs the AICPA Certified in Finan­
cial Forensics (CFF) credential committee. 
He can be contacted via email at muelt­
zen@ueltzen. com.
3 Madoff's purported split strike conversion strategy involved the purchase of indexed stocks and the use of put and call options at predefined prices to establish a ceiling 
and floor. Madoff would sell “out of the money” and into government-backed securities according to proprietary market indicators.
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